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In 1989 and 1990 a number of people were charged with sexual offences in 
Newfoundland arising out of the care of children at the Mount Cashel Catholic 
Orphanage staffed by Irish Christian Brothers. The charges stemmed from 
allegations of abuse levelled by former residents who resided at the home 
between the years 1973 to 1976. Informations charging the accused were laid in 
January 1989. Preliminary inquiries were held in the spring and summer of that 
year. In June of 1989, while the preliminary inquires were being held, a Royal 
Commission of Inquiry was appointed pursuant to the Newfoundland Public 
Inquiries Act.1 The Royal Commission of Inquiry was given a broad mandate. It 
was asked to review the police investigation that was conducted in 1976 into 
allegations of abuse at the orphanage to determine if there had been a coverup of 
the abuse. The Commission of Inquiry held public hearings concerning the 
allegations and had these hearings broadcast by a local cable company to cable 
subscribers in the St. John’s area.
During the course of the inquiry, nearly all of the persons who had 
complained of being abused in 1973 through to 1976 were called to testify at the 
public hearings. Their evidence was taken under oath and televised. Broadcasting 
the complainants’ evidence generated a tremendous amount of ancillary publicity. 
The highlights of the evidence were broadcast on the nightly news, reprinted in the 
newspapers and spawned two books. One of the books, entitled Unholy Orders2 
acknowledged that the primary source of materials for the book was the Hughes 
Commission of Inquiry. The other publication was the memoirs of one of the 
complainants.3 Both of these books were published prior to the trials of the 
accused.
An accused person faced with this situation who wishes to protect his or her 
right to a fair trial, or more specifically, his or her right to a jury trial, has limited 
options. One possible course of action is to apply to the Supreme Court for an 
order to stay the proceedings of the inquiry. This is usually achieved by means 
of an injunction, as was done in Stcur v. Houlden.4 To be granted a stay, the 
applicant has to establish that the inquiry complained of is, in effect, a substitute 
for a preliminary inquiry which is a matter falling outside the jurisdiction of the
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Province. The onus appears to be a heavy one as illustrated by the Newfoundland 
Court of Appeal in/?, v. English5 where the majority held:
[T]H8it the Hughes Inquiry was essentially an investigation into the criminal justice 
system of Newfoundland in so far as it pertains to the events alleged to have 
occurred at Mount Cashel in the 1970s. None of its terms of reference primarily 
involved the determination of whether or not anyone had sexually abused another 
or have been sexually abused by another is not a criminal investigation and was not 
a substitute for a preliminaiy inquiry.
The fact that the evidence generated by the inquiry was essentially the same 
evidence that would have been called at a preliminary inquiry was not a factor in 
the majority’s decision. The court considered the issue as confined to the terms 
of reference of the inquiry itself. The troubling aspect of this development from 
the point of view of the accused is that it appears to place a positive onus on the 
accused to protect his or her own right to an impartial jury trial, unimpaired by 
this type of publicity. Alternatively, the majority decision suggests that the accused 
would be unsuccessful in an attempt to obtain a stay of proceedings or other 
Charter* relief on the grounds of pre-trial publicity alone. Certainly no such 
application would be entertained by a Court until after the jury selection 
procedure has been tried and has failed to produce an impartial jury. In R. v. 
Vermette,1 Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé stated:
In my view, a stay of proceedings was, in this case, premature. It is only at the 
stage when the jury is to be selected that it will be possible to determine whether 
the respondent can be tried by an impartial jury ... In'deciding the question, one 
must not, in my view, rely on speculation ... In an extreme case (and the present 
certainly qualifies) such publicity should lead to challenge for cause at trial, but I 
am far from thinking that it must necessarily be assumed that a person subjected 
to such publicity will necessarily be biased.8
The only avenue left open to the accused is to apply to challenge potential 
jurors for cause. The method of challenge for cause is outlined in s. 638 of the 
Criminal Code of Canada.9 This procedure was extensively considered in R. v. 
Hubbert.10 Presently, the procedure requires the Judge to randomly select two 
persons, usually from the jury panel, to try potential jurors for cause. These two 
persons must decide whether or not a juror is indifferent towards the accused and
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the Crown. The test to be used by the two triers is described in the Hubbert 
decision as follows:
In this era of rapid dissemination of news by various media, it would be naive to 
think that in the case of a crime involving considerable notoriety, it would be 
possible to select 12 jurors who had not heard anything about the case. Prior 
information about a case, and even the holding of a tentative opinion about it, 
does not make partial a juror sworn to render a true verdict according to the 
evidence.11
The questioning of the potential jurors by the challenger was further circumscribed 
by the Supreme Court in R. v. Sherratt:12
If the trial judge is satisfied that there is some “foundation” to the challenge, then 
the trial of the truth proceeds. The questioning of the prospective juror must be 
relevant. This is another reason why the trial judge must be given an adequate 
explanation for the challenge outside of the mere words of the section. 
Questioning in this phase should not become a “fishing expedition” . . . . While it 
is no doubt true that trial judges have a wide discretion in these matters and that 
jurors will usually behave in accordance with their oaths, these two principles 
cannot supersede the right of every accused person to a fair trial, which necessarily 
includes the empanelling of an impartial jury.13
Curiously, the procedure, as outlined in s. 638, is silent as to any questioning of the 
initial two randomly chosen triers. This problem arose in R. v. Kenny:14
Relying upon the expert testimony and the other evidence placed before the Court, 
defence counsel submitted that, because the jury pool has been bombarded for so 
long and in such an intensive manner with specific information about the 
allegations against the accused and with other prejudicial information about him, 
and because there is evidence that prejudices are still strongly held, and because 
potential jurors and triers are not capable of recognizing their prejudices and so 
may not excuse themselves, and because the normal safeguards of jurors’ oaths, 
judicial admonitions and challenge for cause will likely not be effective, a real 
question arises as to whether the court can be satisfied that the accused’s right to 
a fair trial by an impartial jury can be met at all in the circumstances of this 
case.15
If the trial judge does not allow questioning of the two randomly chosen triers, 
then the jury selection process may be tainted by the two triers’ inability to 
recognize partiality in other potential jurors. This problem is further exacerbated 
by the selection procedure itself. The trial for cause takes place before the jury
11 Ibid. at 291.
12[1991] 1 S.GR. 509 [hereinafter Sherratt],
nIbid. at 527, 532.
14(1991), 92 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 318 [hereinafter Kenny].
^Ibid. at 331.
panel. Consequently, during the questioning process of the potential jurors the 
jurors themselves may express dislike towards the accused, offer opinions of guilt 
about the accused or give additional information about the accused in answer to 
the questions put to them. All of this may elevate the atmosphere of bias toward 
the accused. The challenge procedure undertaken before the jurors are ultimately 
selected subjects them to a lengthy parade of other potential jurors, a great 
number of whom express opinions as to the accused’s guilt. Ultimately, the jurors 
who are selected cannot help but be influenced by these opinions. In addition, as 
observed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sherratt, “information obtained upon 
an ultimately unsuccessful challenge for cause may, however, lead the challenger 
to exercise the right to challenge peremptorily or to stand aside the particular 
juror.”16
Ideally, counsel for the accused in a case where there has been extensive 
publicity must examine potential jurors as to the degree of their knowledge and 
opinion about the case. Counsel for the Crown should then use pre-emptory 
challenges to eliminate jurors with little or no knowledge of the facts surrounding 
the case, based on the information revealed in the challenge process. But as Cory 
J. noted in R. v. Bain:17
The impugned provisions permit the Crown to obtain a juiy that would at the very 
least appear to be favourable to its position rather than an unbiased jury. It is 
suggested the Crown Attorney, as an officer of the Court, would never act unfairly 
in the selection of a juiy. Yet the most exemplary Crown might be so 
overwhelmed by community pressure that just such a step might be taken.
In the circumstances of a case where adverse publicity has generated massive 
amounts of negative publicity, it would be naive to think that the Crown Attorney 
would be immune to community pressure during the jury selection process. 
Despite the obvious difficulties that have arisen in the jury selection process in 
cases of this nature, the courts have been reluctant to question the underlying 
tenant of the jury process -  that jurors will abide by their oaths despite the 
amount of extrinsic information about the accused they may have been subjected 
to. In Kenny  ^Barry J. was faced with this issue insofar as expert evidence was 
called suggesting that it would not be possible to select an unbiased jury. He 
stating that:
Dr. Ogloff also submitted that the challenge for cause procedure is likely to be 
ineffective in selecting impartial jurors in the present case ... . In the 
circumstances I believe I should heed the direction of Dickson C J.C., that “until 
the paradigm is altered by Parliament, the court should not be heard to call into 
question the capacity of juries to do the job assigned to them.” I realize that there 
have been more recent studies, such as that of Kerr, Kramer, Carroll and Alfrni,
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which continue to find evidence that the present system of trying to select impartial 
juries is ineffective. I am not persuaded, however, that there is anything so 
significantly new and startling in these, in comparison to what was previously 
available to Parliament and the Supreme Court of Canada, as to require me to 
strike down the jury system which dates back to the Maffia Carta of 1215.18
Though it seems reasonable for the Court to balance the interests of the 
media’s right to publish information about trials against the rights of the accused 
to a fair trial process, the question that remains is whether it is reasonable to 
attempt this balancing act in situations where publicity and media attention have 
been generated directly from the appointment of a commission of inquiry. The 
nature of the publicity generated by a public inquiry is very different from that of 
routine media coverage. Ordinarily, a newspaper or television story does not 
include statements taken under oath at a formal hearing. Moreover, the fact that 
these statements are coming from an officially sanctioned source greatly enhances 
their impact and believability.
The accused suffers a two-fold effect from a public inquiry. First, there is the 
effect of the publication of detailed allegations against him or her. Second, the 
accused’s right to remain silent about the allegations is infringed. An accused, 
therefore, has two choices. He or she can testify at the public inquiry, deny the 
allegations and be subjected to cross-examination at the hearing, though this may 
not afford ordinary protections equivalent to a court hearing, or the accused can 
leave the allegations unanswered in the media to prejudicial effect.
In Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry)19 the Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal considered the legality of the inquiry into the circumstances surrounding 
the explosion in the Westray Mine, given that there were a number of charges in 
relation to the explosion before the courts. The Court stated that:
It seems to me that if the Westray Inquiry proceeds to hear evidence prior to 
disposition of the charges laid against the four respondents there is a high degree 
of probability that the respondents’ s. 11(d) fair trial interests on those charges will 
be infringed. In addition to the risks posed because of pre-trial publicity the right 
to silence of the respondents charged entitles them, for the reasons previously 
stated, to refuse to testify before the inquiry. This will mean that incriminating 
testimony will likely be given that may go unanswered.20
The court went on to consider the English experience concerning public 
inquiries:
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In England there is a general rule that if Parliament has established a public 
inquiry to investigate a matter of public concern, no matter what comes out of the 
inquiry, charges will not be laid. As a general rule witnesses who testified at an 
inquiry are given immunity from prosecution.21
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal elected to order a stay of the inquiry stating 
that:
There is a temptation to apply Vermette and simply say that any Charter 
infringement issues can be dealt with at the trial of the charges under the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act. While such a course of action might be 
satisfactory to deal with the effect of pre-trial publicity in the respondents right to 
a fair trial, it would not take into account the unfairness that is created by the 
Commissioner’s ability to conduct an investigation in the respondents’ involvement, 
if any, leading up to the explosion without the respondents having the protection 
of normal criminal law procedures relating to investigations of offences carrying 
the possibility of penal consequences. What is in issue if the inquiry proceeds 
before the trials is not only the effect of pre-trial publicity but also the 
infringement of the respondents’ right to silence and the state’s potential use of the 
inquiry as an investigative tool that is not limited by the standard procedural 
safeguards imposed on the state when investigating the possibility of criminal 
offences having been committed. We cannot overlook the fact that there is an 
ongoing criminal investigation and that the four respondents charged already have 
their liberty interest at risk.22
The effect of this would appear to be that the Court has recognized that the 
appropriate time to grant Charter relief to an accused whose right to a fair trial 
has been infringed by the actions of the commission of inquiry is at the outset of 
the inquiry before the investigation has begun. If Charter relief is sought after the 
inquiry takes place, the problem arises as to what is an appropriate remedy for the 
accused pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter. It is clear that the jury selection 
process in its present form cannot adequately protect the accused and enable the 
selection of impartial jurors.
The most appropriate method of dealing with this problem lies with the 
legislature. When faced with allegations of public misconduct, the legislature (or 
Parliament) must decide whether or not civil or criminal action would resolve the 
matter. If neither criminal nor civil action will suffice, they can elect to establish 
an inquiry. In most instances, there is no reason to assume that a public inquiry 
cannot effectively be carried out following the resolution of any criminal charges. 
The public interest would not be served by jeopardizing criminal trials through the 
establishment of an inquiry before outstanding criminal charges are resolved.
